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ABSTRACT
Considerable evidence suggests that information is acquired more easily within than across firm
boundaries. I explore why this is observed in the setting of clinical development. Since the mid-
1980s, pharmaceutical firms have partly contracted out the operational aspects of clinical trials to
Contract Research Organizations (CROs). Using detailed project-level data for 53 firms, I document
that even after controlling for a number of alternative explanations, knowledge-intensive projects
are more likely to be assigned to internal teams, while data-intensive projects are more likely to be
outsourced. The statistical exercise is complemented by in-depth interviews with six pharmaceutical
and biotechnology firms. The qualitative evidence confirms that incentives for knowledge and data
production are more easily kept in balance in the firm's own internal labor market than in that of its
suppliers. Moreover, firms use relational contracts to ensure that their employees' incentives are both
balanced and relatively high-powered.
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Although Hayek (1945) hailed the price system’s ability to channel local information
to dispersed economic participants, considerable evidence supports the proposition that in-
formation is acquired more easily within than across ﬁrm boundaries — particularly if this
information is complex or idiosyncratic. With the notable exception of Coase’s (1937) semi-
nal contribution, this alleged superiority led early research to view a reduction in asymmetric
information as the deﬁning feature of hierarchies. For instance, Arrow (1974) viewed one
of the advantages of organizations as the ability to economize in communication through
a common code; and Riordan (1990) deﬁned vertical integration as cost-plus contracting
together with the buyers’ ability to monitor upstream input costs.
These approaches were criticized because they failed to explain how bringing a transaction
from the market into the ﬁrm by itself would alleviate asymmetric information problems. The
lack of a satisfactory answer probably explains why subsequent research on the boundaries
of the ﬁrm focused more on the hold-up problem and less on information asymmetries (Klein
et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995).
This paper shares with the earlier stream of research a focus on how ﬁrm boundaries
alter the nature and quality of information acquired within and across ﬁrm boundaries. But
in keeping with the contributions of more recent research (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1994),
rather than assuming that managers “know more” about the activities of their own employees
than they do about those of their subcontractors, I study how employees’ incentives change
with the integration decision, and how these incentives in turn inﬂuence the acquisition of
diﬀerent types of information.
I focus on the outsourcing of a particular information-intensive activity: the coordina-
tion of clinical trials sponsored by pharmaceutical companies. This setting provides an ideal
testing ground. While empirical studies of the “make or buy” decision have provided sub-
stantial evidence pertaining to the costs of competitive contracting in technology-intensive
industries, past research has focused mostly on capital-intensive sectors (Monteverde and
1Teece, 1982) and R&D outsourcing (Pisano, 1990). This paper extends this literature to
settings where the key output is information.
Since the mid-1980s, pharmaceutical ﬁrms have partly contracted out the operational
aspects of clinical trials to Contract Research Organizations (CROs). I argue that variation in
project characteristics leads to variation in the relative importance of employees’ eﬀort on two
tasks that compete for their attention: data production — the routine manipulation, storage,
and transfer of symbolic information within established categories; and knowledge production
— the establishment of novel conceptual categories, hypotheses, and causal associations
(Osberg, Wolﬀ, and Baumol, 1989). Firms respond to this variation by choosing to outsource
or insource the project. Each option entails a diﬀerent allocation for a key decision right that
deﬁnes the ways in which ﬁrms aﬀect the employee’s choice of eﬀort and its allocation across
diﬀerent tasks. Since it is harder to measure performance in knowledge production than to
measure performance in data production, the ﬁrm chooses to assign its own employees to
projects for which the former are relatively more important than the latter. In so doing,
it ensures that incentives for both tasks are kept in balance. Conversely, data-intensive
projects are more likely to be outsourced, as distorting the allocation of eﬀort is less costly
for these projects. This argument implies that heterogeneity in project characteristics will
be systematically related to the integration decision.
Using detailed data on 6,826 clinical trials sponsored by 53 ﬁrms between 1995 and 1999,
I document that even after controlling for a number of alternative explanations, knowledge-
intensive projects are more likely to be assigned to internal teams, while data-intensive
projects are more likely to be outsourced. The credibility of this ﬁnding hinges critically
on the ability to distinguish empirically between these two types of projects. Variation in
the location of research activity provides a rich source of heterogeneity at the project-level,
as clinical trials typically involve a variety of diﬀerent research sites: academic medical
centers, private practices, community hospitals, or even dedicated, for-proﬁt research cen-
ters. Because of the peculiar career-based incentives in academic medicine, I argue that the
proportion of academic investigators in a clinical study captures the relative importance of
knowledge-production activities relative to data-production activities. Although this variable
2provides the most robust ﬁndings, several other project characteristics yield similar conclu-
sions. These results ﬁt with Holmstr¨ om’s (1999) subeconomy view of the ﬁrm, according to
which balanced yet “sluggish” incentives constitute hierarchies’ mixed blessing.
The statistical exercise is complemented by in-depth interviews with personnel of six
pharmaceutical and biotechnology ﬁrms, as well as employees of CROs — at multiple levels
of decision-making responsibility and functional expertise. The qualitative evidence enables
me to reconcile the subeconomy view with practitioners’ intuition that low-powered explicit
incentives need not be inconsistent with creativity and initiative inside ﬁrms. These char-
acteristics ﬁgure prominently in accounts of life inside hierarchies (Monteverde, 1995) and
ﬁrms’ superior ability to create and transfer knowledge are often ascribed to them. I ﬁnd
that ﬁrms use relational contracts (Simon, 1951; Levin, 2003) to ensure that employees’
incentives are both balanced and relatively high-powered. The choice is not between market
and hierarchy, but between the hierarchy of the ﬁrm — in which subjective performance
evaluations are combined with ﬂat explicit incentives — and the hierarchy of its subcontrac-
tor — whose virtue stems precisely from the ability to provide high-powered incentives on a
narrow set of monitorable tasks.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting
and the informational constraints on contracting in clinical development. Drawing on the
qualitative evidence, Section 3 develops speciﬁc hypotheses relating project heterogeneity
to the integration decision. Section 4 presents the data, descriptive statistics, and main
econometric results. Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Tapered Integration in Clinical Development
In order to gain regulatory approval for market introduction, the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) requires that a pharmaceutical company provide substantial evidence of
a drug’s eﬀectiveness, through adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations. Although
the precise details of these requirements have evolved over the years, proof of eﬀectiveness
must be provided by the results of randomized controlled trials.
3In contrast to early-stage discovery research, pharmaceutical ﬁrms contract out the con-
duct of experimental human studies to independent physicians called clinical investigators,
and rely on clinical monitors to recruit, coordinate, and supervise the large number of investi-
gators required to conduct experimental human studies. Clinical monitoring is an important
elements of “Good Clinical Practices” (DHHS, 1997), a set of rules mandated and enforced
by regulatory authorities around the world. Since this paper studies the outsourcing of this
activity, it is worth understanding precisely its characteristics as a distinct occupation.
2.1 Clinical Development as an Information-intensive Activity
Clinical monitors are prototypical information workers. They do not produce useful
goods or enjoyable services; rather, they typically spend their time creating and altering
symbols written on pieces of paper or on magnetic disks. Moreover, their output can be
condensed into the package insert that comes bundled with the prescription drug sold to
ﬁnal consumers. The information produced in clinical development is of two types: data —
information that can be transmitted without loss of integrity once the syntactical rules re-
quired for deciphering it are known; and knowledge — the establishment of novel conceptual
categories, hypotheses, and causal associations.
According to their narrow job description, clinical monitors ensure that the information
that originates from the doctors participating in a clinical study is accurate (in the sense
that the case report forms submitted to the regulatory authorities reﬂect exactly the source
documents, i.e., the original patient records and charts) and is structured in accordance
with standards laid out by the regulatory agency and the particular ﬁrm sponsoring the
trial. These unglamorous tasks are critical to the extent that skimping on data quality can
jeopardize the scientiﬁc credibility of a new drug application and damage the reputation of
the ﬁrm with regulators. As such, clinical monitoring involves the routine manipulation,
storage, and transfer of symbolic information within established categories (Osberg et al.,
1989). Data consists of codiﬁable information, i.e., information structured into a set of
4identiﬁable rules that can be easily communicated. In particular, it is alienable from the
individual or ﬁrm who wrote the code (Kogut and Zander, 1992).
Clinical monitors also produce knowledge — search rules or heuristics that identify prob-
lems and the elements consisting of their solution. Much of it often remains tacit, in that
the formal expression of the solution is unlikely to capture fully the procedures that led
to it (Polanyi, 1966). The process of knowledge production consists of interactive tasks —
such as mediating disputes or gaining the trust of third parties and subordinates — that
are very diﬃcult to reduce to a sequence of “if-then-do” steps. According to this broader
job deﬁnition, clinical monitoring cannot be reduced to the mass-production of clinical data
geared towards regulatory approval.
The signiﬁcance of knowledge production in clinical development is probably best un-
derstood through example. The following anecdote was reported by the Vice President for
Clinical Aﬀairs at a biotechnology company. To perform a clinical trial for a drug used to
treat pulmonary hypertension (a life-threatening condition), this company recruited inves-
tigators from academic medical centers and private clinics. Puzzled by a very slow patient
enrollment into the study, the clinical team leader asked the monitors to investigate and iden-
tify the root-cause of the problem. The monitors noticed a pattern in the patient enrollment
statistics: the for-proﬁt centers were lagging far behind the academic centers. Upon further
investigation, the monitors determined that the delays were caused by the requirement that
patients undergo a lung biopsy to determine their eligibility. In academic centers, this test
could be performed and the results provided to patients on the same day, while in the private
clinics, conﬁrmation of eligibility was postponed for several days because of the need to ship
biopsy samples to an outside laboratory for analysis. With this information, the study team
amended the protocol to substitute a type of specialized X-ray for the biopsy requirement.
The ability to perform the screening of patients in a single day resulted in a much improved
enrollment process.
This anecdote is illustrative of the importance of knowledge production in clinical de-
velopment. A particularly important challenge is to acquire, synthesize, and assimilate
5information generated locally by clinical investigators, either through direct interaction with
patients or by purposeful analysis. Since they are in contact with the complete set of investi-
gators participating in a clinical study, monitors can bring information and problem-solving
capabilities together at a single locus (von Hippel, 1998), sometimes resulting in the pro-
duction of idiosyncratic knowledge about experimental compounds and the diseases they are
intended to treat.1
The distinction between data and knowledge production is essential, as monitors need
to allocate eﬀort across both tasks, and these activities diﬀer in the extent to which inputs
can be monitored, and performance measured and contracted upon. The problem of bal-
ancing incentives across tasks is brought under sharper focus by the outsourcing practices
of pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
2.2 Stylized Facts of Clinical Development Outsourcing
Since the mid-1980s, monitoring and data management (along with other ancillary op-
erational tasks) have been increasingly outsourced to specialized subcontractors called Con-
tract Research Organizations (CROs). Over time, these suppliers have extended the range of
services they provide to include protocol design, biostatistical analysis, and report writing.
The contract research industry until recently grew at the brisk pace of 20% per year, and
it is estimated that up to one ﬁfth of overall clinical development budgets are captured by
these independent ﬁrms, representing slightly less than $7 billion in 2001 (Parexel, 2003).2
Clinical development outsourcing diﬀers from other arm’s length contractual settings in that
1In the extreme, clinical monitors may become conduits for serendipitous medical ﬁndings. Gelijns et al.
(1998) provide numerous instances of unexpected beneﬁts from medical research, of which the most recent
example is probably the case of viagra and heart disease (Kling, 1998).
2Although fully explaining the emergence of the contract research industry is beyond the scope of this
paper, a variety of factors appear to have contributed to the diﬀusion of outsourcing practices. These
include the increased codiﬁcation of the operational and routine aspects of clinical studies in the 1980s;
the rise of the biotechnology industry and its attendant cohort of ﬁrms with discovery but no clinical
development capabilities; and the initial estimate by established pharmaceutical ﬁrms that outsourcing
would cut development costs at a time when the industry was under signiﬁcant pressure to reduce drug price
inﬂation (Ellison and Wolfram, 2000).
6the boundaries of the ﬁrm can shift on a project-by-project basis.3 CRO teams are generally
in charge of key operational aspects of the study, with little or no input into knowledge pro-
duction. Moreover, for a given study, sponsors may choose to retain some functions in-house
while contracting out others to a single or multiple CROs. Other characteristics of vertical
relationships in clinical development deserve mention.4
Most importantly, clinical development provides an instance of tapered integration, whereby
a ﬁrm produces some of its requirements using its own labor, while contracting for the rest
on the market (Carlton, 1979). Using data that will be described in more detail below, I
compute the fraction of activity that is outsourced in a given year as the proportion of clinical
sites in the ﬁrm’s portfolio corresponding to projects coordinated by CROs. The distribution
of the resulting variable, %CRO, is displayed in Figure 2. It is relatively uniform, but with
a mass point at 0: a sizable number of ﬁrms outsource none of their trials in a given year.
Figure 3, which graphs the distribution of the mean outsourcing propensity for the period
1995-1999, makes clear that this mass point is not an artifact of ﬁrm eﬀects. Only ﬁve ﬁrms
refrain from using CROs during the whole period, while only two contract out all of their
trials. Most ﬁrms seem to use CROs moderately: the mean outsourcing propensity is 29%,
the median 20%.
It is important to clarify that three issues that are often the focus in studies of ﬁrm
boundaries — liability protection, asset ownership, and appropriability — are minor consid-
erations in pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ outsourcing decision. First, CROs do not shield pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms from responsibility for the integrity of the studies they sponsor (DHHS, 1997).
In this regard, these suppliers are very diﬀerent from accounting ﬁrms, who can be held
3Throughout the paper, the words study, trial, and project are synonymous. Similarly, the words drug,
compound, and molecule are used interchangeably.
4Figure 1 provides a summary schema of the clinical trials process. It depicts a pharmaceutical ﬁrm (whose
boundary is drawn using the thick solid line) concurrently developing three drugs, using three distinct cross-
functional product teams (whose boundaries are drawn using the thin dotted line). The box corresponding to
team #1 has been blown up, revealing the diﬀerent functions necessary to the successful development of drug
#1. For each drug, there is a portfolio of trials (three in the case of drug #1, two of which — trial #2 and
trial #3 — are outsourced to two diﬀerent CROs). The clinical monitors (both inside the pharmaceutical
ﬁrm and the CROs) oversee the gathering of clinical data that takes place in a variety of clinical sites
(hospitals, private clinics, Academic Medical Centers) under the stewardship of clinical investigators.
7liable for the accuracy of their audits.5 Second, the physical assets used in production (such
as computers) are non-speciﬁc, and asset ownership does not appear relevant for incentives.
This is important insofar as the recent literature on ﬁrm boundaries identiﬁes integration
with residual rights of control over physical assets (Hart, 1995; Baker and Hubbard, 2003).
Finally, appropriability concerns do not loom large in the outsourcing decision. Clinical
development outsourcing contracts, unlike licensing deals between established pharmaceu-
tical ﬁrms and biotechnology startups, involve no sharing of intellectual property rights.
Moreover, CROs are not viable competitors on the product market.
The assertion that outsourcing in clinical development is not deﬁned by asset ownership,
the right to determine output of pricing decisions, or certiﬁcation makes it all the more
imperative to state precisely what distinguishes a subcontractor from an internal division.
This is discussed in the next section.
3 Outsourcing, Incentives, and Project Heterogeneity
Field research revealed that employee assignment was a signiﬁcant bone of contention
between buyers and suppliers. Outsourcing clinical development involves relinquishing a key
decision right to suppliers: the ability to match particular employees to speciﬁc projects. In
fact, it is useful to take the transfer of this decision right from the buyer to the supplier as
the deﬁnition of outsourcing in clinical development. Interviews indicate that the identity,
skill-level, and job design of CRO employees cannot be easily contracted upon. In the words
of an outsourcing manager: “CROs keep giving us bad people to choose from, and there is
nothing I can do about it.” Others highlighted instances where a team of seasoned veterans
had been promised by a CRO, but “rookies” had been substituted for the “A-team” at the
last minute. This bait-and-switch tactic appeared to be relatively common. Formal contracts
5In a phone conversation with Dr. Murray Lumpkin, Deputy Director of FDA’s Center for Drug Evalua-
tion Research, it was apparent that regulators do not perceive situations where sponsors monitor their own
studies as raising conﬂict-of-interest issues. For vertical disintegration as a device to shield the ﬁrm from
liability, see Ringleb and Wiggins (1990).
8do not solve the issue because buyers — or a court of law — cannot distinguish voluntary
turnover from opportunistic reassignment to another client.
Focusing on employee assignment is also useful because it brings into focus how employ-
ees’ incentives change with the integration decision. The data-production process can be
partitioned into a set of simple, monitorable tasks whose output can be contracted upon
(albeit in a distortionary fashion). Knowledge production, on the other hand, is heavily
inﬂuenced by employees’ ability to learn from the previous stages of a project and to ap-
ply this knowledge creatively during subsequent stages. Moreover, project-speciﬁc learning
is deeply embedded in the particular routines, structures, and processes used by the ﬁrm
to integrate knowledge into collective action. This means that measuring performance is
arduous, let alone inferring eﬀort devoted to knowledge production from observable signals
of performance. In this respect, clinical development can be analyzed through the lens of
a multitask agency problem (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991): when two substitute tasks
compete for the attention of an agent, and these tasks vary in the extent to which eﬀort is
observable, it may be optimal to provide low-powered incentives for both tasks, since high-
powered rewards may skew the agent’s allocation of eﬀort away from the costly-to-monitor
task. In the limit, with complete unobservability of eﬀort on one task, it may be justiﬁed to
provide no contingent rewards for any of the tasks. While performance on the monitorable
task suﬀers, no eﬀort distortion is induced by the incentive scheme.
Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1994) elaborate on this framework and argue that principal
ownership of assets, ﬂat performance incentives, and exclusion from alternative tasks are
complementary instruments that jointly characterize the employment relationship. They
show that such a system of incentives will be used when balancing incentives is valuable, i.e.,
when it is hard or costly to measure performance on important tasks. Slight modiﬁcations
are required to adapt these insights to the setting of drug development. I argue that formal
contracts can specify which party gets to make skill-project matches, but not how these
matches get made as the project unfolds. As pointed out by Maskin and Tirole (1999),
a decision right with this characteristic can play a role akin to that of asset ownership in
9Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1994) and Hart (1995). Similarly, limiting the agent’s attention
to a single project is equivalent to excluding alternative tasks.
Could pharmaceutical ﬁrms deal with multitask incentive problems within their bound-
aries, for example by providing high-powered incentives to employees in their “data” division,
and lower-powered — but balanced — incentives to employees in their “knowledge” division?
I surmise that such ﬁrms would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to credibly commit to irrevocably allocate
decision rights regarding employee assignment to their “data” division. Moreover, equity
norms in internal labor markets likely constrain ﬁrms’ ability to maintain such two-tiered
incentive systems.
3.1 Qualitative Evidence at the Firm Level
Over a two-months period, I visited six pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
and interviewed representatives of seven suppliers over the phone or in industry conferences.
The interview data provide rich (sometimes vivid) ﬁrm-level evidence regarding the rela-
tionship between job design and incentives in clinical development. It is less convincing as a
source of project-level evidence, but is helpful in suggesting hypotheses that can be fruitfully
tested using project-level data.
The managers making staﬀ deployment decisions inside the pharmaceutical ﬁrm and their
counterparts inside the CRO did not share the same objectives. Inside the ﬁrm, managers
strived to produce all the information required to reach the correct “go/no-go” decision for
a particular drug, subject to a budget constraint which includes “time costs” (i.e., foregone
sales opportunities because the drug, whose patent clock is ticking, lingers in development).
Inside the CRO, managers maximized time-to-project completion, subject to two constraints:
data quality had to exceed some minimum standard, and billable hours for the ﬁrm as a
whole had to reach some target. This second constraint arose from the fact that CROs ag-
gregate their clients’ peak demand for clinical development services. This could be proﬁtably
achieved only to the extent that monitors were drawn from a common pool and assigned on
10a “ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-serve” basis to projects.6 In contrast, in-house monitors specialized thera-
peutically, and assignment decisions took idiosyncratic expertise into account. For example,
if a monitor had worked on previous studies for a drug, he/she was very likely to be assigned
to the follow-on study as well.
Through its eﬀect on the ability to match individual skills with speciﬁc projects, out-
sourcing skewed clinical monitors’ attention and eﬀort away from knowledge production
towards data-processing tasks. A manager overseeing suppliers at a large pharmaceutical
ﬁrm described the unbalanced incentives of CRO employees in these terms:
“...We have a line-by-line deﬁnition of the CRO’s responsibilities. That means that the CRO
is less likely to notice stuﬀ that might be going on at the sites. There are no incentives for
the individuals at CROs for capturing ‘soft data’, unlike here, where you get rewarded at every
level. At a CRO, you might work for two or three sponsors at the same time. So it’s all about
hard deliverables. Anything beyond the contract you do not get.”
CRO employees conﬁrmed the importance of individual, explicit incentives. The data-
production process generates a large number of observable performance measures. For exam-
ple, it is possible to monitor the number of case report forms checked by a clinical monitor
in a given amount of time; data inconsistencies give rise to queries that reﬂect directly on
the thoroughness of source-document veriﬁcation; and query resolution times measure the
eﬃciency of the troubleshooting process when data inconsistencies arise. While pay was not
directly contingent on these metrics, I found that bonuses and advancement in the CROs’
internal labor markets were heavily dependent on them. Indeed, in interviews with former
CRO employees, suppliers were characterized as “data sweatshops,” and their employees as
“data mules” or “CRF Collection Machines.”
Buyers often included penalties into contracts for on-time delivery of the data, along
with stipulations regarding acceptable data quality. These incentives trickled down to the
supplier’s individual employees. Rewarding speed in clinical development could be counter-
productive: a slowly-performed clinical trial justifying FDA approval contributes much more
6This discussion assumes that in-house managers do not worry about keeping staﬀ busy. To a large extent,
this reﬂects the fact that CROs act as buﬀers against pipeline shocks. While a more complete exploration
of this idea lies outside the scope of this paper, it is studied in depth elsewhere (Azoulay, 2003a).
11to ﬁrm value than a rapidly-performed trial leading to rejection of the new drug applica-
tion by the regulator. Pharmaceutical sponsors appeared aware of the fact that “paying for
speed” may have unintended consequences, and therefore used rules of thumb to determine
which studies were good outsourcing candidates — studies for which eﬀort distortions would
not be too costly.
In contrast to CROs, pharmaceutical ﬁrms relied on subjective performance evaluations
as a source of employee incentives. Since knowledge production was diﬃcult for employees
and pharmaceutical ﬁrms to contract upon, it tended to be rewarded through the use of
implicit incentives such as subjective bonuses and promotions. The ability to provide such
implicit rewards appeared inherently tied to the ability to match individual skills with speciﬁc
projects.
Moreover, job design diﬀered across buyers and suppliers along one critical dimension.
While employees of pharmaceutical ﬁrms dedicated their time fully to a single project (or at
least to a single drug), CROs assigned employees to multiple projects at a time, and shifted
them laterally from project to project as the need arose. By increasing the informativeness of
commonly used performance measures, multi-project assignment kept down the cost of mon-
itoring data-production activities. What is known in the industry as the data management
process provides a good illustration of this phenomenon. After the data has been collected,
but before the study database is “locked,” a number of cross-checks are applied to verify
the data’s integrity. Whenever an inconsistency arises, a query is generated, and the source
document (the original patient chart) is checked for accuracy. This is a very time-consuming
and costly process. Queries can be traced back to particular monitors and reﬂect on the
thoroughness of their work, but are a noisy measure of individual performance: The num-
ber of queries is also inﬂuenced by the quality of the coordinating staﬀ at the clinical sites,
whether patients had unusual complications, etc. However, CRO managers can potentially
meter queries originating from multiple sites monitored by the same employee over the same
time period. For data-production activities, extracting signal from noise is therefore easier
inside the CRO than inside the pharmaceutical ﬁrm, where monitors are assigned to a single
project at a time.
12In summary, the qualitative evidence is consistent with the view that ﬂat performance
incentives, subjective performance evaluations, and single-project assignments characterize
the employment relationship inside pharmaceutical ﬁrms. In contrast, CRO hierarchies are
characterized by steep individual incentives for speed and data quality, and simultaneous
assignment to multiple projects for multiple clients. This analytic framework parallels that
used in Baker and Hubbard (2003). In the context of the trucking industry, these authors
argue that outsourcing provides strong incentives with respect to utilizing trucks intensively,
and this interferes with job designs that give drivers non-driving responsibilities. Here, I
argue that outsourcing provides CROs strong incentives that interfere with job designs that
give clinical monitors knowledge-production responsibilities.
Complex clinical development outsourcing contracts can mimic formal aspects of hier-
archy, but cannot ensure the close coordination between scientiﬁc and operational decision-
making enabled by balanced incentives. Nor can they secure consummate — as opposed to
perfunctory — cooperation from employees that is the deﬁning characteristic of relational
employment (Stinchcombe, 1986; Williamson, 1975). As a result, spot-market outsourcing
in clinical development potentially carries a number of contractual hazards.
One might wonder why relational contracts between pharmaceutical ﬁrms and their sup-
pliers cannot govern the assignment of workers to projects. In practice, there is overwhelming
evidence that buyers use a large number of diﬀerent suppliers, often replace current suppliers
with new ones, and more generally seize the opportunities provided by intense competition
upstream. Clients may ﬁnd it to their advantage to segregate their project portfolio between
insiders and CRO employees precisely because outsourcing distorts the allocation of eﬀort
across tasks. CROs may be “data sweatshops,” but sweatshops have their uses: the provision
of high-powered incentives on a set of narrow, monitorable tasks. Moreover, outsourcing to
CROs diﬀers from many settings analyzed previously in that the “buy” option involves not
self-employed individuals, but a separate hierarchy. Relational governance between ﬁrms
would entail not one but two implicit contracts: a relational outsourcing contract between
the two ﬁrms, and a relational employment contract within the supplier. Establishing and
maintaining such a cascade of implicit agreements is challenging. While some pharmaceuti-
13cal ﬁrms have attempted to engineer relational contracts with CROs (“partnerships” in the
industry lingo), these eﬀorts have ended in failure (Azoulay, 2003b).
3.2 Project-level Hypotheses
In order to analyze outsourcing patterns at the transaction level of analysis, I argue that
variation in project characteristics leads to variation in the relative importance of employees’
eﬀort on data-production and knowledge-production activities. It also leads to variation in
the extent to which eﬀort on each of these activities is observable. Since it is harder to
measure performance in knowledge production than in data production, the ﬁrm chooses
to assign its own employees to projects for which the marginal return to the former is
higher than the marginal return to the latter. In so doing, it ensures that incentives for
both tasks are kept in balance for these knowledge-intensive projects. Conversely, data-
intensive projects — those studies for which the marginal return to data-production eﬀort
is particularly high — are more likely to be outsourced, as distorting the allocation of eﬀort
is less costly and may even be beneﬁcial because of the high-powered incentives faced by
CRO employees. Similarly, project-level variation in the observability of eﬀort inﬂuences the
integration decision. Holding the marginal returns to eﬀort constant, less costly monitoring
of data production (knowledge production) should lead to a higher (lower) propensity to
outsource a project. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the marginal return on data-production eﬀort relative to knowledge-
production eﬀort, the more likely is the project to be outsourced, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2a: The propensity to outsource is increasing in the project-level costs of moni-
toring data production, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2b: The propensity to outsource is decreasing in the project-level costs of moni-
toring knowledge production, ceteris paribus.
In the next section these hypotheses are tested using detailed project-level data for a
large sample of ﬁrms.
144 Empirical Model and Results
The foregoing discussion suggests that the integration decision will be a function of
project and ﬁrm characteristics. I address these predictions by estimating a binary choice
model. Because the estimation strategy is aﬀected by data availability, this section begins
with a description of the data. Results from the econometric speciﬁcation are then presented.
4.1 Data and Sample Characteristics
The data used in this essay come from a dataset of clinical investigator contracts made
available by FastTrack Systems, Inc. Since 1991, clinical trial information has been gathered
from subscribing pharmaceutical companies in order to help them better plan and negotiate
investigator grants. Moreover, since 1995, FastTrack has recorded whether a CRO was
involved in each trial. The breadth of the data’s longitudinal and cross-sectional coverage is
impressive, with 137,000 clinical investigator contracts corresponding to 17,000 clinical trials
for the period 1991-1999. While the sample of ﬁrms is unbalanced (coverage improved as
the service gained popularity), it comprises 90 subscribing units. Although no company can
be identiﬁed by name under our conﬁdentiality agreement, the sample includes nearly all
large pharmaceutical companies (US- and foreign-based), as well as most large biotechnology
ﬁrms. Given the propensity of biotechnology start-ups to rely on established ﬁrms’ clinical
capabilities, the sample is highly representative of the industry as a whole.7
Since information about outsourcing is only available for the last ﬁve years of data,
aggregating observations to the clinical trial level results in 6,826 clinical studies, sponsored
by 53 ﬁrms, for the development of 1,039 experimental compounds. For each project, the
dataset records a number of study characteristics, the name of the molecule, an identiﬁer
7I thank Mark Hovde, Anca Serban, and Mariann Best for explaining the subtleties of the data. Diﬀerences
between “subscribers” and “ﬁrms” stem from the fact that certain ﬁrms have several subscriptions (e.g.,
ABC Pharma-UK and ABC Pharma-US). Firms resulting from a merger are assigned a distinct subscription
identiﬁer, a convention the usefulness of which cannot be stressed enough in the context of the pharmaceutical
industry. The sample comprises data from 9 companies out of the Top 10 ﬁrms, 26 out of the top 30 ﬁrms, and
33 out of the Top 50 ﬁrms, where the rankings reﬂect R&D spending listed in annual reports to shareholders
in the year 2000. Companies in the sample spent a total of $41,434 millions in R&D that year. This
correspond to 82% of the aggregate amount reported by the Top 45 heaviest spenders.
15for the ﬁrm sponsoring the study, and a dummy variable that denotes the involvement of a
CRO. I complement these data with information from company annual reports.
The strengths of the data lie in their broad industry coverage and ﬁne-grained level of
detail, but they are not without limitations. The information on outsourcing is summa-
rized by a dummy variable, which does not capture all the richness and heterogeneity of
outsourcing practices at the project level (e.g., no information is available to describe the
substance of the duties performed by the CRO during the project). Moreover, the clinical
trials included in the dataset do not constitute the universe of studies sponsored by these
ﬁrms. Excluded from the data are any trials for which investigator contracts are negotiated
directly by the CRO. In other words, the statistical exercise can only reveal information on
a speciﬁc contracting margin: the decision to outsource, conditional on having retained the
selection of clinical investigators in-house.8
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
For the industry as a whole, Figure 4 shows that the proportion of clinical studies
outsourced tripled during the sample period, from 7.70% in 1995 to 22.90% in 1999. This
dramatic increase provides a useful reminder that outsourcing practices in drug development
are relatively new and still evolving.
Tables 1A and 1B present descriptive statistics. Table 1A contains information on ﬁrm-
level variables such as outsourcing intensity, pipeline shocks, and overall clinical research
experience. Table 1B displays variables measured at the project level, such as whether or
not the trial was outsourced, the phase of the trial, the proportion of investigators involved
who are academics, and other observable project characteristics.
Since traditional measures of ﬁrm size (such as sales or assets) do not seem appropriate,
I use the number of clinical sites as the basic unit of activity in clinical development. Trials
8According to practitioners, fully-outsourced studies are more likely to be performed post-approval and/or
to examine the consequences of long-term maintenance treatment. One would expect these trials to be more
data-intensive on average than the trials composing the sample analyzed here. If this is the case, excluding
these studies makes it harder to detect an eﬀect of knowledge considerations on the propensity to outsource.
16diﬀer extensively in size (between 1 and 275 sites in this sample), and practitioners often use
rules of thumb that assign a given number of sites to clinical monitors. Therefore, I measure
ﬁrm size as the log of the total number of clinical sites in the ﬁrm’s portfolio, averaged
over the last three years; pipeline shocks are computed as the deviation between the total
number of sites in the ﬁrm’s portfolio from the past three years moving average; and ﬁrm-
level experience in drug development is measured by the cumulative stock of clinical sites
for the ﬁrm.
A cursory analysis of Table 1B reveals a number of empirical regularities. Outsourced
studies tend to be larger and shorter in duration than studies coordinated by in-house staﬀ.
They involve a lower proportion of academic sites and are more procedure-intensive.
Table 2 displays the distribution of outsourcing intensity by trial phase. Drug develop-
ment is a sequential process beginning with Phase I safety trials, continuing with Phase II
“proof of principle” trials, and ending with larger-scale, eﬃcacy Phase III trials designed to
validate Phase II results in an environment as similar as possible to that of regular medical
practice. Phase IV studies are performed post-approval, often in an eﬀort to ensure ac-
ceptance of the new drug by prescribing physicians. Uncertainty regarding the compound’s
toxicity, side eﬀects, and other idiosyncrasies is being resolved upon completion of each stage,
so that one would expect knowledge-production activities to assume decreasing prominence
(relative to data-production activities) as development unfolds.
The raw data broadly supports this intuition, but with some important caveats. While
outsourcing is most frequent in Phase IV studies, there does not seem to be a diﬀerence in
the level of outsourcing between Phase II and Phase III trials. One explanation for this lack
of diﬀerence is that Phase III trials are more likely than Phase II trials to be outsourced
on a “turnkey” basis, so that the diﬀerence observed in the sample understates the true
diﬀerence.9 Phase I trials are outsourced more often than either Phase II or Phase III trials,
but this is expected. Phase I trials correspond to projects whose degree of complexity vary
widely, from the most sophisticated (such as “ﬁrst-in-man” pharmacokinetic and pharmaco-
9Another explanation pertains to a relatively recent trend in clinical development that has lead some
ﬁrms to blur the deﬁnitions of Phase II and Phase III trials, and conduct so called “Phase II/III” studies.
17dynamic studies) to the most routine and codiﬁed (such as bioavailability and bioequivalence
studies which can take place at any time along the path to regulatory submission). Unfortu-
nately, the data at hand makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the “routine” from the “complex”
Phase I studies. Phase I oncology studies constitute an exception. Because of their harm-
ful side-eﬀects, nearly all cancer drugs are ﬁrst tested in patients — as opposed to healthy
volunteers — so that one can be fairly sure that these studies correspond to “ﬁrst-in-man”
experimentations. Only 9.5% of these studies are outsourced.
Table 3 reports the distribution of outsourcing across 14 broad therapeutic areas. While
this is a crude classiﬁcation (for instance, the anti-infective class covers a wide spectrum of
medical indications, from HIV to run-of-the-mill bacterial infections), outsourcing is most
frequent in the pain and cardiovascular areas, which are characterized by large average
trial sizes and relatively well-understood technologies. Conversely, it is very infrequent in
oncology, a therapeutic class for which clinical protocols are scientiﬁcally involved and the
data collection requirements extremely complex. Similar patterns emerge at the therapeutic
indication level of analysis. The projects analyzed here pertain to 361 indications, and only
for a small number of those are there enough observations in the sample for a meaningful
descriptive look. As an illustration, 34% of 59 ulcer studies are outsourced, but only 11% of
229 transplantation studies.
Although the tabulations above do not allow to draw ﬁrm conclusions, they point to
sources of variation that need to be controlled for in multivariate analyses.
4.3 Variation in the Composition of Investigator Teams
The clinical trials process is managed through a three-tiered hierarchy: the product
team inside the pharmaceutical ﬁrm (who must integrate the result of each study into the
overall development plan for the experimental drug); the clinical monitors who oversee the
quality of the data and attend to the smooth unfolding of the trial from an operational stand-
point; and the set of clinical investigators who enroll patients into the study and treat them
according to an agreed-upon experimental protocol. Below, I infer the relative importance of
18knowledge-production and data-production activities for clinical monitors (the middle rung
of the hierarchy) from project-level variation in the composition of the investigator team (the
lower rung of the hierarchy). The empirical validity of this approach hinges on a detailed
understanding of the investigator-selection process by pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
Variation in the location of research activity provides a rich source of heterogeneity
at the project-level, as clinical trials typically involve a variety of diﬀerent research sites:
academic medical centers, private practices, community hospitals, or even dedicated, for-
proﬁt research centers. The distinction between academic and non-academic testing sites
is important. Over the past 15 years, academic medical centers have gradually ceased to
be the preferred locus of industry-sponsored drug development activities.10 The academic
and non-academic sectors diﬀer in the relative emphasis put on knowledge production (as
opposed to data production) by clinical investigators. In addition to industry-supported
clinical trials, academic investigators also carry out “basic” clinical investigations, which are
rewarded by publications, NIH grants, academic prestige, and promotion. Career concerns
may induce academic physicians to shift their attention away from careful record-keeping
and other activities directed at ensuring the quality and integrity of the data. In contrast, in
commercial sites, investigators’ allocation of eﬀort is not skewed away from data production
by competing incentives.
This diversity provides pharmaceutical ﬁrms with the opportunity to carefully match the
composition of the investigator team with the type of problems most likely to arise during
the clinical study. For example, when the focus of the study is on conﬁrmation of a scientiﬁc
hypothesis, the objectives of investigators in the commercial sector will be more aligned with
sponsors’ interests. In contrast, when hypothesis generation is more valuable or when the
product team “is ignorant about what it is ignorant about,” then encouraging investigators
to follow their scientiﬁc intuition might become comparatively more valuable.
10The data used in this paper show that the proportion of academic clinical sites at the industry level
decreased steadily from 66% in 1993 to 57% in 1999. FDA records show that the number of US investigative
sites tripled between 1990 and 1995 — from 6,159 sites in 1990 to 18,557 sites in 1995, with nearly all of this
growth taking place in the for-proﬁt sector (Hovde and Seskin, 1997).
19I argue that the same unobserved project characteristics lead pharmaceutical ﬁrms to
select a team of investigators dominated by academics (respectively by non-academics) and
to value relatively more knowledge-production eﬀort (respectively data-production eﬀort) by
clinical monitors. As a result, a higher proportion of academic investigators should decrease
the probability that a given trial will be outsourced.
Investigator selection is, like outsourcing, a decision variable of the ﬁrm. One might
worry that particular types of investigators (e.g., “for-proﬁt”) are matched with particular
types of clinical monitors (e.g., CRO employees) because of some other unobserved factor.
Such endogenous matching (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002) threatens the validity of the
interpretation above.
Although the data do not provide a credible source of exogenous variation for the choice
of investigators, a number of alternative explanations can be ruled out using econometric
methods, as explained below. As a complement, I have also pursued the strategy of exam-
ining qualitatively the investigator selection process at each of the six companies visited for
this study. Interviews with personnel in charge of investigator recruitment provided strong
evidence that the outsourcing decision and investigator choice are not jointly determined.
While these ﬁrms carefully chose the mix of academic and non-academic investigators par-
ticipating in the studies they sponsored, they did so in response to opportunities to learn
about the disease and the experimental molecule, not as a function of the integration de-
cision. Another consideration appeared to play a role in the investigator selection process:
“Credentializing” the drug in the eyes of regulatory authorities and potential prescribing
physicians. Whereas the ﬁrst rationale has implications for the outsourcing of clinical mon-
itoring, the second rationale does not. This observation forms the basis for an additional
check on the validity of the paper’s empirical strategy: If investigator mix is a valid proxy for
knowledge, the outsourcing/investigator mix relationship should hold less strongly when one
has independent reasons to believe that “credentializing” the drug looms larger as a concern
than knowledge acquisition.11
11Other factors mentioned by my respondents as determinants of the investigator mix include the type
of clinical venues favored by the target patient population, and the social connections of senior staﬀ. In
204.4 Econometric Considerations
Estimating the eﬀect of project and ﬁrm characteristics on the integration decision
requires a procedure that accommodates its discrete nature. A standard approach to this
type of problem is to model a latent variable, CRO¤; the relative ineﬃciency of outsourcing








where i indexes projects, j indexes ﬁrms, t denotes calendar time, and X (respectively Z) is
a vector of observable project-level (respectively ﬁrm-level) characteristics. In reality, rather
than observing CRO¤; I observe the integration decision itself:
CROijt =
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I assume that the "’s are drawn from a logistic distribution; this choice is motivated by the
need to accommodate more sophisticated error structures, as explained below. The next few
paragraphs detail the construction of the variables included in X and Z:12
The clinical development process is plagued by uncertainty. The compound’s potency, its
associated toxicities, adverse interactions, and side eﬀects are revealed gradually as develop-
ment unfolds. Ex ante, ﬁrms can form priors as to the diﬃculty of “letting the compound
show its true value.” This prior will be based on characteristics of the study, some of which
are observable, such as project phase (exploratory vs. conﬁrmatory), compound novelty
(“ﬁrst-in-class” vs. “me-too”), complexity of the target indication, etc. The applied re-
searcher’s challenge is to ﬁnd high-quality, project-level proxies that act as shifter of (1)
the marginal returns to knowledge- and data-production activities; and (2) the diﬃculty of
observing knowledge- and data-production eﬀort.
Marginal return to data- and knowledge production eﬀort. I construct the variable
%AMC, the proportion of investigators in the trial aﬃliated with academic medical centers.
these data, the pharmaceutical ﬁrm is handling the selection of investigators whether or not the project is
outsourced. Therefore, social networks between pharmaceutical team members and academic physicians are
unlikely to drive the association between outsourcing and reliance on academic medicine.
12Because the residuals corresponding to projects belonging to the same ﬁrm in a given year cannot be
considered independent, standard errors are estimated allowing for clustering by ﬁrm-year (Moulton, 1990).
21A higher proportion of academic investigators should make it less likely that a given trial will
be outsourced, since CROs and their employees are not rewarded, explicitly or implicitly, for
the acquisition of knowledge from the clinical sites.
I employ the set of trial phase dummies discussed earlier (the Phase IV category is
omitted). Phase I oncology trials should be less likely to be outsourced than Phase II trials,
which in turn should be less likely to be outsourced than Phase III trials. All trials on the
critical path to regulatory approval should be less likely to be outsourced than Phase IV
trials (which take place after a drug has been approved).
Clinical studies taking place in hospital settings are likely to require more careful moni-
toring of serious adverse events — a knowledge-intensive task — than outpatient studies. As
a result, inpatient studies should be less likely to be outsourced, ceteris paribus. I include
the INPATIENT dummy to capture this eﬀect.
The more balanced incentives faced by internal monitors should also inﬂuence the team’s
ability to adapt to changes in circumstances surrounding clinical projects as they unfold. I
use the protocol length of a clinical study (DURATION) as a proxy for the probability of
change orders. I expect shorter studies to lend themselves more easily to outsourcing.
Finally, I include two variables expected to shift downwards the marginal return to
knowledge-production eﬀort relative to data-production eﬀort. The number of distinct med-
ical procedures in the study (]PROCEDURES) proxy for the data-processing burden associ-
ated with the clinical trial. A similar argument can be made regarding project size (]SITES).
Knowledge-production activities tend to be underemphasized in larger trials where logistical
issues take center stage. High values for both variables should increase the likelihood of
outsourcing.
Observability of data- and knowledge production eﬀort. Clinical studies for which
data-production activities are less costly to monitor are likely to be good candidates for
outsourcing. I argue that data-production monitoring costs are a decreasing function of the
concentration of patients across clinical sites. Regardless of whether a study is outsourced,
pharmaceutical ﬁrms audit the quality of their clinical data by selecting a sample of sites
22in the study (generally those with the largest patient enrollment) and replicating source-
document veriﬁcation. A higher Herﬁndahl index of patient concentration, HERF, should
translate into more accurate estimates of data quality and lower auditing costs.
Unfortunately, the data does not provide good proxies for the costs of monitoring knowl-
edge production. One would expect that keeping track and assimilating idiosyncratic knowl-
edge generated at clinical sites would become harder in trials involving a large number of
clinical investigators. On this ground, larger trials should be less likely to be outsourced.
Since study size also shifts the relative marginal return to data- and knowledge-production
eﬀort, its predicted eﬀect on the likelihood of integration is ultimately ambiguous.13
While project-level variation generates nuanced hypotheses regarding the eﬀect of multi-
tasking incentives on the integration decision, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that there are diﬀer-
ences in ﬁrms’ average propensity to outsource. These ﬁrm-level patterns can be explained
by invoking other rationales for outsourcing.
Adjustment costs. Practitioners often justify outsourcing to CROs by referring to the
“peaks and valleys problem” — the ability to start large trials quickly, and more importantly
the ﬂexibility aﬀorded by the ability to cancel a service contract in the eventuality of a
pipeline “dry spell.” Drugs enter and exit the pipeline frequently, creating wide variation in
the number of employees needed to staﬀ clinical-study teams. Confronted with large sunk
costs of hiring and ﬁring employees, partial vertical disintegration enables pharmaceutical
ﬁrms to cope with sudden and lumpy shifts in the level of demand for clinical trial services.
This is the case because technology shocks tend to be uncorrelated across ﬁrms, creating a
role for a free-standing upstream supplier to pool labor demands more eﬃciently (Carlton,
1979; Abraham and Taylor, 1996). Similarly, larger ﬁrms or ﬁrms that are developing drugs
in multiple therapeutic areas may be better able to redeploy employees from terminated
projects to new ones. The speciﬁcation includes ﬁrm-level variables meant to capture the
inﬂuence of pipeline ﬂuctuations on the project-level outsourcing decision: SHOCK, SIZE
13To a large extent, HERF and ]SITES reﬂect exogenous factors related to disease prevalence and geog-
raphy. Moreover, regulatory authorities provide guidelines in statistical design that severely constrain ﬁrms’
latitude in deciding upon the level of these variables. In what follows, they will be treated as exogenous.
23and SCOPE. These variables may have less explanatory power when analyzing the project-
level outsourcing decision than when investigating the extent of outsourcing at the ﬁrm
level. Nonetheless, it seems important to account for their eﬀect at this ﬁner-grained level
of analysis.
Heterogeneous ﬁrm capabilities. Firms that have developed extensive internal capabili-
ties in clinical development may face higher relative costs of outsourcing than less experienced
ﬁrms. To capture the importance of overall development expertise, I compute EXPERI-
ENCE, the cumulative count of clinical sites involved in the ﬁrm’s portfolio of projects up
to year t. I also include BIOTECH (whether the ﬁrm was present on the product market
as of 1995) and US PRESENCE (whether the ﬁrm was US-based or, in the case of foreign
ﬁrms, whether it owned a US subsidiary with clinical development facilities as of 1995).
In recent years, there has been a marked trend in favor of multinational clinical trials.
This evolution results from a greater regulatory harmonization that enables pharmaceutical
companies to seek simultaneous approval in a larger number of countries. Many large CROs
claim to provide “global reach” in their marketing brochures, and specialized suppliers may
be in a better position than their upstream clients to amortize the sunk infrastructure costs
required to manage multinational studies. The likelihood of outsourcing is expected to
increase in the project’s geographic span, ]COUNTRIES.
4.5 Results
Table 4A reports estimates from the speciﬁcation above. I begin by examining the
hypotheses pertaining to incentives, adjustment costs, and heterogeneous ﬁrm capabilities
separately (columns 1, 2 and 3), before proceeding to speciﬁcations that investigate these
arguments concurrently (columns 4 and 5). All these models include year, therapeutic class,
and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Fixed eﬀects at the regional and therapeutic class level control for
the array of cross-class and cross-region diﬀerences in history, technological opportunities
and state of knowledge that have been constant over the sample period, while year eﬀects
control for the secular increase in the prevalence of outsourcing at the industry level.
24Model (1) yields coeﬃcient estimates generally in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2b. %AMC
is strongly negatively correlated with outsourcing, as expected. Projects in pre-approval
stages of development are less likely to be outsourced than Phase IV, post-approval projects
(the omitted phase dummy in the speciﬁcation). Shorter and more procedure-incentive stud-
ies are also more likely to be outsourced, as expected. The coeﬃcients before INPATIENT
is not statistically signiﬁcant. I ﬁnd strong support for Hypothesis 2b: patient concentration
across study sites is a strong predictor of outsourcing. As noted above, the interpretation
of the eﬀect of ]SITES is ambiguous. The ﬁnding that the likelihood of non-integration is
increasing in study size is consistent with Hypothesis 1, but inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a.
Model (2) investigates the eﬀect of adjustment costs. Surprises in the level of activity
(SHOCK) increase the likelihood of outsourcing. Moreover, this eﬀect is less pronounced
for large ﬁrms, as evidenced by the eﬀect of the interaction term between SHOCK and
Ln(SIZE). Finally, the propensity to outsource is increasing in the ﬁrm’s therapeutic scope
(but not in the ﬁrm’s size).
Model (3) focuses on the role of heterogeneous ﬁrm capabilities. The likelihood of out-
sourcing any given project decreases with the ﬁrm’s overall experience in clinical develop-
ment. Biotechnology ﬁrms and ﬁrms without a US presence are more likely to outsource.
Geographic span does not appear to have any eﬀect.
Of course, if multiple rationales for outsourcing exist, statistical tests that account only for
one class of explanations will be mis-speciﬁed. In column 4, I check whether the results above
are robust to the simultaneous inclusion of all predictor variables. Quite remarkably, I ﬁnd
that this is the case. Some results are even strengthened compared to columns 1 through 3.
For example, the coeﬃcients estimates for the PHASE variables are ordered monotonically.
While this result has intuitive appeal and is very robust across speciﬁcations, an inequality
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are in fact equal. On the other hand, the
magnitudes and statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient estimates for the variables meant to
capture the inﬂuence of adjustment costs are weakened.
25The interpretation of the statistical estimates in column 4 is subject to caution, since it
does not account for the eﬀect of unobserved ﬁrm practices related to both observable study
characteristics and the integration decision. For example, pharmaceutical ﬁrms have been
shown to exhibit heterogeneity in their “taste for science” in the setting of drug discovery
(Cockburn et al., 2000). If pharmaceutical ﬁrms with a strong scientiﬁc culture are both
more closely tied to academia and take a more negative view of CROs because of their lack
of scientiﬁc credentials, then %AMC and outsourcing will covary in the data, but this need
not reﬂect the inﬂuence of monitors’ incentives.
Since I observe a number of projects that diﬀer widely along observable characteristics
(such as %AMC) but are sponsored by the same ﬁrm, a number of alternative interpretations
can be ruled out. In column 5, I add a full set of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to the speciﬁcation, in
eﬀect eliminating all the between-ﬁrm variation in the data.14 Accounting for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity has a dramatic eﬀect on the results: the eﬀect of variables pertaining
to adjustment costs and capabilities disappears, while the hypotheses pertaining to the
multitask agency problem still ﬁnd strong support in the data. The diﬀerences between
columns 4 and 5 illustrate the perils involved in interpreting the results of purely cross-
sectional tests.
I choose Model (5) as a benchmark speciﬁcation and compute the magnitudes for a
number of variables. One of the most interesting results is the statistically and economically
signiﬁcant of the proportion of academic investigators in the trial. At the mean of the data,
increasing %AMC by half a standard deviation (about 20%) decreases the probability of
outsourcing from 17.3% to 15%; increasing HERF by half a standard deviation (about 20%)
increases the probability of outsourcing from 17.3% to 22.5%; while a Phase IV study would
be 8% more likely to be outsourced than a Phase III study.
14Fixed-eﬀects estimators applied to non-linear models are biased because of the incidental parameter
problem. An important issue is to determine whether the number of observations per ﬁrm in the dataset
is large enough for this estimation strategy to be applied with conﬁdence. Using Monte Carlo simulations
for the ﬁxed eﬀect probit model, Heckman (1981) shows that above a critical panel length of eight periods,
the bias is negligible, although this critical length depends on the frequency of the event being studied.
Fortunately, the number of observations available to identify the ﬁrm eﬀects is well above this number here.
26Table 4B displays models that probe the robustness of speciﬁcation (5) to more elaborate
forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Model (6) adds ﬁrm-speciﬁc time trends to the speciﬁ-
cation, thus addressing the concern that ﬁrm-level outsourcing fads might contaminate the
results. Established ﬁrms are often organized into “therapeutic silos” enjoying a large de-
gree of autonomy. If some therapeutic divisions within a ﬁrm exhibit more of a “taste for
science” than others, then ﬁxed eﬀects at the ﬁrm level will not properly account for such
heterogeneity. Model (7) re-estimates the model with a full set of ﬁrm-class interaction ﬁxed
eﬀects. The results obtained in column 5 of Table 4A still hold under these more restrictive
decompositions of the error term.
Another class of alternative interpretations rely on the importance of unobserved disease
or drug characteristics. For some diseases, the supply of clinical investigators is limited
to academic medical centers. In such cases, a small number of academic physicians act as
essential gatekeepers to the patient community, and pharmaceutical ﬁrms might prefer to
monitor such studies with their own employees as a way to nurture these relationships. To
rule this out, Model (8) replaces broad therapeutic class controls by a set of narrow thera-
peutic indication ﬁxed eﬀects. For instance, whereas cystic ﬁbrosis and diabetes trials were
part of the same endocrine disease group in Model (5), Model (8) assigns to both set of
studies its own ﬁxed eﬀect. The structure of the data can even be exploited to account
for unobserved heterogeneity at the molecule level. There is an average of 7 studies per
molecule, with a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 132 studies. Accordingly, Model (9) adds
molecule ﬁxed eﬀects to the regression, sweeping out any idiosyncratic variation in outsourc-
ing propensity related to experimental compounds. In these speciﬁcations, the multitasking
interpretation of the results is subjected to a very stringent test, as only within-indication or
within-drug information is used to identify the eﬀect of covariates on the likelihood of out-
sourcing. Estimation is performed by conditional maximum likelihood, using Chamberlain’s
(1984) ﬁxed-eﬀect logit model. Although some coeﬃcients are estimated less precisely, the
results conﬁrm the earlier estimates.
As a ﬁnal check on the plausibility of interpreting the eﬀect of investigator mix in terms
of the multitasking framework, I interact %AMC with two dummy variables corresponding
27to studies for which the selection of academics is more likely to reﬂect a desire to build up the
drug’s credentials rather than knowledge acquisition concerns. The ﬁrst subsample comprises
547 Phase IV trials. I single out Phase IV trials since they are performed post-approval,
often in an eﬀort to ensure acceptance of the drug by prescribing physicians. Using medical
opinion leaders in academia is a way to shape prescribers’ perception of the new treatment
as legitimate (“seeding the market” in the industry lingo). The second subsample comprises
786 trials corresponding to drugs intended for the 10 most well-treated diseases.15 For
such diseases, more is presumably known about best practices in protocol design, potential
enrollment bottlenecks, acceptable surrogate markers, etc. A ﬁrm might still want to include
prominent academics in these studies, so as to ensure a more expedited review by regulatory
authorities.
If the knowledge vs. data interpretation of the CRO/%AMC relationship is legitimate,
this association should therefore be less likely to hold for Phase IV studies and for trials
corresponding to well-treated diseases. This is indeed the case as can be seen in Table 4C,
which reports the results of regressions that take Model (5) of Table 4A and Model (9) of
Table 4B as baselines, and add the interaction terms %AMC £ PHASE IV (Model 10 and
11) and %AMC £ WELL-TREATED (Model 12 and 13) to these baseline speciﬁcations.
While the main eﬀect of %AMC remains signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude to the results
reported in Table 4B, the interaction terms are not signiﬁcant. While this test does not rule
out all possible endogenous matching mechanisms, it greatly narrows the scope of plausible
alternative interpretations.
4.6 Discussion
Extant theoretical perspectives on outsourcing take contract incompleteness and oppor-
tunistic behavior as their starting point. Yet, they tend to fall into two distinct categories.
The ﬁrst approach views the problem of drawing ﬁrm boundaries as one of facilitating ex-
15These are: Otitis Media, Insomnia, Pneumonia, Bronchitis, Asthma, Rheumatoid Arthritis, Pain, Uri-
nary Tract Infections, Skin And Soft Tissue Infections, and Hypertension. To select these diseases, I drew
from a list of icd9 codes and associated drugs provided to me by Frank Lichtenberg. These 10 diseases have
the largest number of already approved treatments.
28post adaptation to changing circumstances (Williamson, 1985; Tadelis, 2002). The second
approach focuses on the provision of appropriate ex-ante incentives for speciﬁc investments
(Hart, 1995) or the allocation of eﬀort across tasks (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1994; Shepard,
1993). In the ﬁrst approach, the dissipation of quasi-rents through haggling is purely waste-
ful. In the second, investment/eﬀort choices are set below their ﬁrst-best level but parties
bargain their way to eﬃciency conditional on these initial choices.16
This paper analyzes the problem of outsourcing in clinical development through the
lens of the latter perspective. This is a simpliﬁcation, as issues of ex-post adaptation do
arise between CROs and their clients. The contract negotiations are often protracted, with
suppliers attempting to limit buyer’s ability to introduce modiﬁcations during the execution
stage. Of course, the unpredictability of ongoing development projects makes renegotiation
a likely occurrence, and conﬂicts over “change orders” often ensue.
Unfortunately, the data used here are not well suited to test arguments relating bargaining
diﬃculties over post-contractual amendments to the choice of organizational form. One
exception may be provided by the inﬂuence of DURATION, the length of time patients are
enrolled in the study. If the probability of change orders increases with protocol length,
then we would expect shorter studies to be monitored by employees if bargaining costs are
lower inside the ﬁrm (Wernerfelt, 1997; Simester and Knez, 2002). Although the relationship
between the likelihood of outsourcing and DURATION goes in the expected direction, the
statistical signiﬁcance of this eﬀect is not robust across speciﬁcations.
Finally, the multitask agency approach provides too simpliﬁed and static a view of insid-
ers’ incentives. Taken literally, this perspective implies that they would face no incentives
to provide either type of eﬀort if one of the task — knowledge-production — was inﬁnitely
costly to monitor. Yet, the qualitative evidence reveals that pharmaceutical ﬁrms bear little
in common with government agencies or other bureaucracies plagued by lack of employee ini-
16The clinical monitors studied here perform ongoing services for the pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and it is hard
to identify large discrete investments of the sort that might take place at the beginning of a relationship
(Levin, 2003). As a result, I have found it easier to couch the paper’s argument in agency terms, rather
than through the lens of the hold-up problem and speciﬁc investments, but this distinction may be mostly
semantic.
29tiative. Internal monitors are highly motivated, but this stems primarily from career-based
rewards such as subjective bonuses and promotion. By combining the absence of piece rates
with subjective evaluations, pharmaceutical ﬁrms ensure that employees’ incentives are both
balanced and relatively high-powered.
5 Conclusion
This paper performs an empirical analysis of outsourcing in clinical development. I argue
that variation in project characteristics leads to variation in the importance of employees’
eﬀort on two tasks: knowledge production and data production. Since it is harder to measure
performance in knowledge production than to measure performance in data production,
pharmaceutical ﬁrms choose to assign their own employees to projects for which the former
are relatively more important than the latter. In so doing, they ensure that incentives for
both tasks are kept in balance. Conversely, data-intensive projects are more likely to be
outsourced, as distorting the allocation of eﬀort is less costly for these projects.
Consistent with this argument, I document that even after controlling for a number of
alternative explanations, knowledge-intensive projects are more likely to be assigned to in-
ternal teams, while data-intensive projects are more likely to be outsourced. These results
ﬁt with Holmstr¨ om’s (1999) subeconomy view of the ﬁrm, whereby organizations design in-
centive systems in a manner that internalizes some of the contractual externalities present in
markets due to asymmetric information. Focusing on the costs of communicating knowledge
— as opposed to the incentives to acquire it — would lead to an alternative perspective
on the optimal size and scope of hierarchies; Garicano (2000) provides an interesting model
along these lines. How communication costs and incentive problems interact to shape ﬁrm
boundaries is an important topic for future research.
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Firm-level Variables [53 firms, 211 firm-year observations] 
153 clinical studies per firm on average, min.=1, max.=929 
 






%CRO  Proportion of clinical sites in outsourced trials for firm j in year t 211 0.242 0.318  0  1  0.290 
BIOTECH  Firm present on the product market as of 1995  211  0.052  0.223  0  1  0.113 
US PRESENCE  US subsidiary as of 1995  211  0.843  0.364  0  1  0.849 
SCOPE  Therapeutic Scope of firm j in year t 211  3.134  1.571  1  7.571  2.911 
SITES  Number of clinical sites for firm j in year t (×100)  211 3.354 3.739 0.010  23.420  3.191 
SIZE  Size of firm j in year t, three-year site moving average (×100)  211 3.301 3.224 0.057  19.863  3.061 
SHOCK  Deviation of SITES from past three-years moving average (×100)  211  – 0.110 2.702  – 9.900 12.211  0.012 
EXPERIENCE  Cumulative number of clinical sites for firm j up to year t (×100) 211 18.290  16.390  0  61.74  16.110 

















CRO  Was the study outsourced? 
0.173 
(.379) 
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PHASE I – Overall  0.242 0.428  1,663 
PHASE I – Oncology  0.094 0.292 213 
PHASE I – Other Therapeutic Areas  0.263 0.441  1,450 
PHASE II  0.139 0.346  1,594 
PHASE III  0.148 0.356  2,985 


















Cardiovascular  0.225 0.418  725 
Gastrointestinal  0.195 0.397  297 
CNS  0.169 0.375  1,143 
Anti-Infective  0.174 0.379  586 
Oncology  0.103 0.304  1,004 
Immuno-Modulation  0.156 0.363  563 
Dermatology  0.163 0.371  208 
Endocrinology  0.137 0.344  641 
Hematology  0.185 0.390  146 
Ophthalmology  0.099 0.300  121 
Genitourinary System  0.217 0.412  466 
Respiratory System  0.205 0.404  611 
Pain/Anesthesia/Musculoskeletal  0.329 0.461  213 
   39
Table 4A 
Logit Models of the Outsourcing Decision 
 












PHASE I × OTHERS 
0.079 
[0.270] 














































































































































   







   























Firm Fixed Effects  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Log Likelihood  –2,832.47  –2,821.48 –2,825.47 –2,692.23 –2,481.63 
Nb. of Observations  6,689 6,689 6,689  6,689  6,689 
 
All Models include year, therapeutic class, and region fixed effects. Phase IV is the omitted Phase dummy. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm-year cells. 
†  Significant at the  10% level 
*  Significant at the  5%   level 
**  Significant at the  1%   level 
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Table 4B 
Logit Models of the Outsourcing Decision (robustness checks) 








































































































































Log Likelihood  – 2,377.88  – 1,910.56  – 2,091.92  – 1,487.55 
Nb. of Observations
*  6,689 5,861  6,192  4,734 
 
All Models include year, therapeutic class, and region fixed effects; Ln(SIZE), SCOPE, Ln(SIZE)×SHOCK (the 
“adjustment costs”  variables); EXPERTISE and #COUNTRY (the “firm capabilities” variables). Phase IV is the 
omitted Phase dummy. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm-year 
cells. 
†  Significant at the  10% level 
*  Significant at the  5%   level 
**  Significant at the  1%   level 
                                                 
*In fixed effects non-linear models, units for which there is no within-variation in the dependent variable drop out of the 
estimation sample. To make sure that these particular sub-samples are not driving the results, Models (1) through (6) 
were re-estimated using the subset of the data used to estimate Model (9). The results were qualitatively unchanged.   41
 
Table 4C 
Logit Models of the Outsourcing Decision (interaction effects) 












































Log Likelihood  – 2,480.48  – 1,483.74 –  2,479.82 –  1,481.20 
Nb. of Observations  6,689  4,734 6,689 4,734 
 
Column (10) and (12) take the specification of column (5), Table 4A as baseline. Column (11) and (13) take the 
specification of column (9), Table 4B as baseline. All Models include year, therapeutic class, and region fixed effects; 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by firm-year cells. 
†  Significant at the  10% level 
*  Significant at the  5%   level 
**  Significant at the  1%   level 
 
 